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Abstract 
 Security of supply in electricity is questioned in liberalised markets as it is often characterised as a 
public good. We examine if this can be modified allowing for creation of security markets, which can be 
justified by welfare gains. From a welfare perspective it is possible that security levels are too high and 
obtained with too high costs. An efficiency improvement might be to adjust the effort so that marginal 
cost for securing supply are at similar levels in generation capacity and in network maintenance. 
Secondarily, a consumer defined level of security might improve welfare. Finally, different willingness 
to pay among customers and construction of advanced markets might increase welfare further.      
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1. Introduction 
Security of supply in electricity has received widespread attention in light of the 
liberalisation of electricity markets. The basic question is whether liberalised markets will 
secure that adequate capacity is available and whether tight efficiency regulation of 
electricity networks will result in deteriorating quality of network reliability. Maintaining 
security of supply in liberalised electricity markets has been seen as a critical test for the 
functioning of the markets. This has been especially relevant for the existing spot and futures 
markets, and less explicit for the quality aspect of electricity, which has only to a marginal 
extent been covered by markets. This paper describes the possible steps and some necessary 
conditions for establishing markets for security of supply services in a Danish and Nordic 
perspective. In a European perspective increased focus has been put on maintaining quality 
of supply in a liberalised and efficiency regulated market. CEER (2005) refer to 8 countries 
out of 19 European countries covered having specific quality elements included in the 
incentive regulation for distribution (network) companies. This is mainly based on concern 
for that quality would deteriorate in a liberalised and tighter efficiency regulated 
environment.   
For the adequacy aspect of security concern has been raised that market prices are not 
sufficiently high to secure new generation capacity. In particular the peak power resources 
do not seem to be attractive without some capacity payments. Construction of such markets 
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in an efficient way has been broadly discussed in literature including Hogan (2005) and 
Joskow and Tirole (2006), but the linkage with grid investment is less covered. In this paper 
we argue that investment in adequacy in generation and transmission capacities should be 
balanced with the costs of reducing interruptions in the distribution grids.   
There are several possible benefits of having the security aspect covered by a market instead 
of by direct regulation. First step is to secure that a given level of security is satisfied at the 
least costs. A requirement for this is that marginal security costs in generation, transmission 
and distribution are at comparable levels. The argument is that consumers have identical 
cost of interruptions (Value Of Lost Load, VOLL) whether due to generation capacity 
constraints, capacity/ fault in transmission lines or faults in distribution equipment. Costs 
have to be equal across sectors operating in competitive markets and sectors that are directly 
regulated. If the regulator itself is demanding security of supply services from all three parts 
of the power sector the simplest form of a market would be implemented with suppliers and 
a single buyer. This would not result in the optimal level of security as the final demand for 
security would not be reflected; only the regulators estimation of average interruption costs. 
If it is possible to reduce the public good property of security of supply, a market might lead 
to a more correct level of security, but the largest benefits would be associated with possible 
differences in VOLL among customers. Some evidence suggests that there are large 
differences in interruption costs. de Nooij et al. (2007) find large differences between sectors, 
regions and in time for the Netherlands. They also refer to the issue of actually providing a 
level of supply security that is actually at two high levels especially concerning the adequacy 
part.      
Secondly, the possibility of individualised security of supply exists. To the degree it is 
possible to exclude customers; this would imply that different degrees of security can be 
supplied to customers with different costs of lost load. Examples of this possibility exist, but 
it is not a widespread practise in the liberalised power markets of today. The linkage to the 
flexible demand element in the existing power markets is discussed. Flexible demand and 
interruptible load share the property of having to individually affect the load of customers. If 
mechanisms are in place to have individual customers adjust their load with a warning time 
the step to having individual interruption is also possible. Special emphasis is given to 
relating the possible markets to the actual interruptions in Denmark.   
As a majority of interruptions (frequency) are related to distribution grid faults, the cost of 
reducing these faults relative to the cost of maintaining the capacity reserves that secures 
that almost no load has been lost due to capacity constraints is questioned. Would an 
integrated market for security services transfer resources from capacity reserves to 
distribution grid infrastructure? Finally is the equity question. Will we accept discrimination 
among residential customers regarding their supply security and the price they pay for a 
given level of security. In most countries it has not been allowed to discriminate among 
residential customers for their connection costs, network charges and the electricity price 
within a supply area. However as it is now, the security of supply is varying among the 
consumers without this being reflected in any difference in payments.  
This paper is organised with a section presenting the public good property discussion for 
electricity supply security and the modifications required for creating a market for supply 
security. The next section examine the possible welfare gains from creating markets in 
different situations regarding interruption costs distribution and costs of supplying security. 
It argues that full markets are only necessary if there are large and unsystematic differences 
between costs of interruptions for different consumers. Following this a section suggest the 
possibility of gradually moving in the direction of markets first by improving the sources 
providing security of supply and later by involving consumers when this becomes possible 
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by the individual excludability established with interruptible meters in each installation. The 
last sections include conclusions and comments.  
2. Security of Supply and the Public Good Argument 
This section discusses public good characteristics of security of supply and changes as a 
necessary precondition for construction of markets for this ancillary service. 
Security of supply is in the literature regarded as a pure public good, and by others, not 
characterised as a public good. It is a necessary precondition that security of supply is not a 
pure public good to have a well functioning market without having to use regulation.  
Electricity is not valued by consumers solely through its quantitative dimension, but 
rather through services that it provides. Most of such electricity dependent services are based 
on preplanning that assumes a stable supply of electricity to be available at request in real-
time.  Following, security of supply expresses the system's ability to ensure continuous 
supply of electricity at a stable frequency and voltage, and can be seen as the qualitative 
dimension of the electricity good. 
The term ‘Security of supply’ refers to the likelihood that electricity will be supplied 
without interruptions. Thus, often the terms security and adequacy are distinguished so that  
(Oren, 2000): 
• security is the ability of the system to withstand sudden disturbances, e.g., 
disconnection of a distribution line.  
• adequacy is the ability of the system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy 
requirements of the consumers at all times, e.g., have enough power capacity, enough 
network capacity, and system functionality.  
 
In recent years, the main argument for regulation of power market with focus on security 
of supply has mainly been the reading of security of supply as a public good. Several papers 
view security of electricity supply as a public good, e.g., Abbott (2001) “This means that 
security is non-rival in public good terms. Security of supply also appears to be nonexclusive 
in that it is difficult to exclude people from benefiting from that reduced risk associated with 
the construction of additional capacity.” Counter wise, Rochlin (2004) states that ”the market 
provision of an adequate reserve margin does not fail the rivalry or the exclusionary 
principles and does not qualify as a public good”.  
In order for us to evaluate these two contradicting statements, we start out by the 
economic definition of public goods. Public good are often defined as goods that are non-
excludable as well as non-rival. This means, it is not possible to exclude consumers from 
consumption of the good, and at the same time, consumption of the good will not reduce the 
amount of good available for consumption by others (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 
1995). Following, determination of social optimal equilibria in the case of public goods are 
found to be difficult when the number of participants is large, as the amount of people 
knowing each other is relatively small, i.e., the possibility of ones actual marginal benefit 
being detected is very small.  This problem is referred to as “the free rider problem”, which 
typically arise in markets for public goods. Hence, it can be used to explain why regulation is 
needed in markets for public goods. 
 
Figure 1: Classifying goods according to the degree of rivalry and excludability.  A – 
Pure public good, B – Pure private good, and C – Non-rival good. 
The first conclusion to derive from this is that markets for public goods typically need 
regulation in order to reach the efficient level of output. That is, if the security of electricity 
supply is seen as a public good, then we need to have regulation in order for us to reach the 
social optimal level of security of electricity supply. But before we decide on, whether or not, 
we are dealing with a public good, we spend a little more time analysing the two 
requirements non-rival and non-excludable.  
Figure 1 illustrates the two dimensions of public good characteristics with three types of 
goods. Point A is a pure public good where its value to individuals is not reduced by others 
consuming the same good and at the same time it is impossible to exclude anyone form 
consuming the good. If it is possible to exclude consumers individually we arrive at point C 
a non-rival type of good. Finally a normal pure private good is represented by point B in 
Figure 1.    
Abbott (2001) states that security of electricity supply is non-exclusive because, once a unit 
of capacity is added to the system all consumers benefit from the increased reliability that it 
provides. Stoft (2002), finds it non-exclusive because of demand side flaws. He argues that 
since there are no real-time metering and, at the same time, lack of technology required to 
disconnect consumers individually in case of an inadequate supply, security of electricity 
supply is non-exclusive. Counter wise, Rochlin (2004) finds that it is exclusive because, even 
though, it is not possible to exclude consumers ex ante, it is possible to use ex post payment. 
That is, the mechanism to collect charges for using reserves. 
According to Stoft (2002), security of electricity supply is also non-rival because, once 
produced it is unaffected by the amount of consumers that obtains a benefit. This 
corresponds to Abbott (2001) who means that security is non-rival because “any expansion in 
capacity designed to meet growth in demand not only reduces the risk of black-outs for 
those being supplied from the new plant but also reduces everyone else’s risk at no extra 
cost”. Counter wise, Rochlin (2004) finds that this is not the case since using reserves 
decreases the reserve margin and hence, reduces the level of reliability. And when the 
reserve margin is sufficiently low, the use of one unit more leads to load shedding.   
The conclusions regarding non-rivalry and non-exclusion are, therefore, not 
straightforward. Hence, if we should treat security of supply as private instead of public 
good, we need a controversial shift from an ‘obligation to serve’ to ‘obligation to serve at a 
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price’. And following, we need to see a quality differentiation where security of supply is not 
externalized from the market via, e.g., back-up systems. 
This lack of technology to meet these requirements are partly mentioned by Stoft (2002) 
with lack of real-time metering and real-time billing, which causes a lack of demand 
elasticity in the market, and inability to disconnect individual consumers. But recent 
technological developments (Illustrated in Figure 2 with the vertical arrow) have enabled 
individual billing and disconnection excluding free riders, wherefore, we find that security 
of electricity supply does not fail the exclusionary principle, and hence, does not qualify as a 
pure public good. With respect to non-rivalry we find all three statements credible, and not 
contrary.  
 
 
Figure 2: Classifying congestible public goods according to the degree of rivalry and 
excludability (Point D).   
 
If we turn to the definition of congestible public goods, we find goods for which 
congestion reduces the benefits to existing consumers when more consumers are 
accommodated. That is, the marginal cost of accommodating an additional consumer is not 
zero after the point of congestion is reached. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where the 
marginal cost of allowing additional users to consume the congestible public good fall to 
zero after the good is made available to any one user but then rise above zero after N* users 
are accommodated per hour. Examples of congestible public goods are roads, bridges, and 
public parks. In the terms of non-rivalry and non-exclusion, congestible public goods are 
non-rival in consumption only up to a certain point (N*). After the number of consumers 
exceeds a certain amount, the good becomes at least partially rival in consumption (Figure 2 
horizontal arrow). These types of goods are often represented in form of services flowing 
from shared facilities, here, e.g., reserve power to cover failures. In theory, these goods can 
be distributed through markets either by government or by firms through the sale of 
admissions, memberships, or other use-related fees which may or may not receive public 
subsidies (Hyman, 1993).    
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Figure 3: The marginal cost for a congestible public good. (Source: Hyman, 1993) 
Placing the congestible public good in Figure 1 gives a point in the middle of the figure, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. This point corresponds to a good where there is some degree of 
rivalry and price exclusion is possible through tolls.  
Returning to the question on the need for regulation of the quality of electricity supply, 
i.e., security of supply, we face a conclusion with ambiguity. Following, we need to discuss 
to which extent it is possible to use market mechanisms in a market for security of supply, 
and hence, to which extend we need to regulate under the given barriers as well 
technological as administrative.   
 
3. Welfare Gains from Construction of Markets for Security of Supply 
 
Security of supply is one aspect of quality services associated with electricity supply. This 
aspect is not priced directly in the price paid for the electricity, neither in the wholesale 
markets nor in retail sale. Indirectly the price for final consumers includes costs associated 
with maintaining security of supply. The average costs of securing supply are borne by final 
consumers, for example as charges to the system operator, but it is not directly linked to their 
individual demand for security of supply1. Here we investigate the consequences if markets 
for this kind of service are constructed and what will be the possible gains? 
 
Cost minimisation in securing a given level of security of supply 
 
First, it could be expected that a market with competition in the supply of electricity 
security would reduce the cost associated with reaching the level of security. Without a 
market it is not secured that all the possible technologies to increase security of supply are 
made available to the regulator, and in particular not in the correct volume. If the regulator 
has all the information available it is, however, possible to reduce the error relative to the 
market considerably. 
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1 Interruptible contracts also exists in the Nordic market and these contracts price the reduced security of 
supply that these mainly large industrial factories are willing to take. 
Establishing the social optimal common level of security of supply  
Ŝ SHSL
MC 
Security
Reduced loss 
(energy unit)
MC Lost 
energy (D)
Costs per 
energy unit 
(year)
 
Figure 4 Possible welfare loss with an in-optimal level for security of supply  
For the elements of costs also involving consumers and their costs of supply interruptions 
we start by examining one common level of security of supply. 
 
For simplification it is assumed that:  
 
• Cost of interruption per energy unit is independent of duration and timing of the 
interruption 
• All consumers are identical with respect to cost of interruption 
• Marginal cost of limiting the expected loss of energy per year is increasing with 
reduction in expected loss 
 
In Figure 4, there is a possible welfare loss if the arbitrarily chosen level of security is too 
low (SL) or too high (SH) relative to the level Ŝ where consumer’s real cost of interruption are 
equal to marginal costs of supplying additional security. If security is a pure public good, it 
is likely that consumers will express an opinion favouring high levels of security as that is 
not seen as affecting their costs. If authorities and regulators are adjusting to these opinions, 
it is possible that we are having too high levels of security and thereby are experiencing a 
welfare loss. The opposite situation can arise if individuals are asked to actually pay 
additional for security and they understate their willingness to pay to enjoy the free ride on 
this service. 
 
Possible loss due to not serving different levels of security to different consumers 
 
In the next case (Figure 5), we now relax the assumption of consumers having the same 
costs of interruptions. In some studies, for example de Nooij et al. 2007, it has been found 
that industry is experiencing lower costs of being interrupted than do service sectors and 
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private households. For households it is even plausible that there are quite large differences, 
for example, dependent on whether their heating is based on electricity supply or even more 
basic if they are actually at home during the hours when interruptions occur. 
Ŝ = S1 S3S2
MC 
Security
Reduced loss 
(energy unit 
per 
customer)
MC Cust 1 
(D1)
Costs per 
energy unit 
(year)
MC Cust 2 
(D2)
MC Cust 3 
(D3)
 
Figure 5 Different interruption costs for consumers 
 
The demand part of the market for security of supply is particularly important for possible 
welfare losses if the costs of lost energy are different among the consumers. In Figure 5, 
without a market, Customer 2 will be supplied too high security, and Customer 3 too low 
security. Only Customer 1 is experiencing a level of security that corresponds to her 
interruption costs. The welfare loss will, therefore, be the sum of their individual losses. 
The figure illustrate that difference in interruption costs is a major argument for creating 
markets for security of supply, providing different levels of interruption probability to 
different consumers. A market with consumers directly participating implies having 
different levels for security of supply for different consumers. Still, this seems fine in the case 
where there is no difference in supply costs for different consumers as assumed in the case in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
A problematic issue in this simple representation is the difference in costs of establishing 
security of supply to the individual customers. For the network security (failures) different 
levels of interruption probability can be supplied even without the existence of a market. 
This is for example induced by the incentives in network regulation of electricity 
distribution. Network regulation justified by the natural monopoly characteristics of 
electricity distribution networks is widespread. In the last decade this regulation has become 
more complex and in many cases includes elements of quality regulation. Ajodhia et. al. 
(2006a,b) documents the effects of including quality in network regulation in some European 
countries. They find that the quality has increased in Italy by introducing a redistribution 
scheme between distribution companies based on quality performance. The objective has 
been to increase quality by benchmarking because the quality was perceived as low. If this is 
based on aggregate measures of performance the regulated distribution/network companies 
will be induced to reduce interruptions for customers for which quality improvement is 
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relatively cheap. In this way there is introduced an incentive to provide customers with 
different quality levels (supply security).   
4. Gradually Improving the Way Security of Supply is Established and Reducing 
the Costs 
We have argued that the discussion of public good properties is important for electricity 
security of supply. Additionally the possible welfare gains from changing the provision and 
the supply of security are strongly dependent on the level of willingness to pay and the 
differences among consumers. Based on this we here argue that there are several natural 
steps that can be taken moving towards solutions resulting in cost reductions and welfare 
gains. It is not necessary or optimal to take all steps to improve the situation and even the 
technical and economical implementation is not feasible for all steps yet. 
Each step towards a more advanced response to security of supply preferences is strongly 
dependent on the above discussion of the public good characteristics. In this section we use 
the pure public good as point of departure for a possible increase of market functionality on 
allocating resources to security of supply and setting the level of security in a cost efficient 
way. 
 
First Step: Cost minimization  
Cost minimisation in securing a given level of security of supply is the main objective in 
this step. The first step can be implemented in the case where the public good argument still 
holds (Point A in Figure 1). In this case the level of security has to be set arbitrarily at a 
socially acceptable target, which is not derived from consumers individual marginal benefits 
at different levels of security of supply. Given the level of security of supply, the cost of 
supplying this has to be minimised. That is, we have to find the most cost efficient way to 
ensure the level of security of supply. This implies that marginal cost of supplying security 
for customers must be identical for possible suppliers of this service. 
Using the definition of security of supply with respect to adequacy and security we find 
the following elements of the problem: 
 
System adequacy: 
• Costs of securing adequate power capacity 
• Costs of securing adequate transmission capacity 
• Costs of securing adequate distribution capacity 
 
Security (probabilities for failures):  
• Back-up short term – marginal cost of reducing probability 
• Frequency etc. – marginal cost of reducing probability   
• Transmission and distribution faults – marginal cost of reducing probability   
 
All the system elements contributing to the probability of loss of load should have 
marginal costs for reducing the probability at similar levels. This can be achieved without 
creating new markets. A basic assumption behind the above arguments is that failures and 
interruptions are independent, what will not always be the case but is assumed to hold for 
the majority of interruptions.  
In this step, there is an option of allowing the State or the supplier of security to supply 
different levels of security to individual customers based on difference in costs of supplying, 
and not under consideration of the consumers marginal benefits. This is relevant for 
networks and is already induced by the quality regulation included in many countries for 
regulation of electricity network monopolies. The reason for differentiating the level of 
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security of supply is given by the network structure of the system and not the difference in 
consumer behaviour. 
For adequacy consumer resources can be mobilised by increasing demand response to 
compete with generation and network capacity as sources of security. This will reduce both 
the costs of supplying a given level of supply security and will increase the average 
efficiency of electricity generation, which constitute the primary benefit of demand response. 
Increasing demand response involves overcoming both regulatory and technical barriers 
which is becoming cheaper and is included in the smart meters. But first and foremost final 
customers must be charged the price that signals a capacity constraint, at least the hourly 
prices signalling the generation capacity constraints. In the Nordic market the demand 
response options and problems have among others been covered in Andersen et. al. (2006) 
focusing on Denmark. Increased demand response in the short run reduces the costs of 
supplying a given level of security, but is not an action of the consumer expressing the 
marginal willingness to pay for security of supply, but only the marginal willingness to pay 
for electricity. 
 
Second Step: Maximizing consumer benefits 
Like the first step, the second step represents the case where the public good argument 
still holds. But in this step the level of security has to be set accordingly to the consumer 
marginal benefits estimated or expressed.  
Adjusting the level of security of supply to average interruption costs for consumers 
(value of lost load) does not necessarily involve the construction of a market. The costs for 
consumers (households as well as business) have been estimated from several studies in a 
large number of countries. This can be used for setting a less arbitrarily target for security of 
supply. Estimates are in general not based on expressed willingness to pay as this will not be 
as accurate as what would be established, if a well functioning market could be constructed 
due to the free rider problem still being present when we have a public good. The aim of this 
step is to reduce the welfare losses related to an inefficient level of security of supply, i.e., a 
level that diverge from the average consumer marginal willingness to pay as was illustrated 
in Figure 4. We find that authorities setting the level of security at high and increasing levels 
in some countries should question whether we are actually supplying a security level that is 
too high. Too high a level imply a welfare loss that consumers are also burdened by through 
their too high network charges and even more likely too high public service obligation 
charges from system operators responsible for adequate capacity and reserves. 
 
Third Step: Individual levels for security of supply  
The welfare gain of moving to this step is found when there are large differences among 
consumers cost of lost load or their willingness to pay for security as illustrated in Figure 5, 
In this third step we need to be able to distinguish between the individual consumers, i.e. 
relaxing the public good characteristics. In order for the individual consumer to express their 
own marginal willingness to pay, it must also be possible to exclude customers from security 
of supply, in order for them to have an incentive to reveal their true willingness to pay for 
this service. Hence, interruptible supply to customers and metering equipment is needed. 
This means that we are relaxing the assumption of non-excludability (Point C in Figure 1). 
This step is different from a construction with compensation payments identical for 
different customers which is normally the model chosen in the European compensation 
payment schemes for long interruptions. Such a scheme is an option in a regulatory 
instrument belonging to the described second step where regulators provide network 
companies with incentives to adjust their marginal effort for security against the 
compensation payments for interruptions they have to provide. Associating individual 
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customer’s costs of lost load with customer specific compensation payments, or payments for 
specific levels of security of supply will be consistent with this third step. 
If the objective is to reduce the possible welfare losses associated with differences in 
marginal benefits between different consumers as described in Figure 5, this step will require 
some kind of a market that involve consumers. The market need not necessarily be a 
separate market, but could be an integration of the security costs in ordinary power markets. 
This requires that individual consumers are charged, and chose their level of demand based 
on different prices.     
 
Fourth Step: Adjusting to differences in costs with respect to timing and duration 
Like the third step, this fourth step represents a case where the public good is relaxed. This 
step involves customers even more than in the third step, as this step targets the possibility 
of responding to different costs of interruptions depending on the duration and the timing of 
interruption. Such flexibility requires a more sophisticated market, were it is quite unrealistic 
that customers could monitor price movements so closely, but automatic equipment 
following general set price parameters could make individual demand respond to price 
signals. That is, a reaction to system disturbances at once they occur.  
The supply side of security would adjust to such a market setting by adjusting their effort 
depending on the time of the day and the season and the duration of the interruption for 
each customer (customer group). If long interruptions imply high costs for some customers 
effort to re-establish their supply will be prioritised relative to other customers. If winter 
time interruption is critical for some individual consumers (consumer groups) the manpower 
and equipment to re-establish their consumption will be allocated to these customers in 
winter time and much less in summer time. 
 
How much can be achieved without relaxing the characteristics of a public good? 
Only the first and second steps are possible without relaxing the public good 
characteristics. If the real market from the third step with participation of consumers is to be 
established it must be possible to exclude customers from security of supply to give them an 
incentive to reveal their willingness to pay for this service.  Hence, interruptible supply to 
customers and smart metering equipment is needed. Already today metering is mandatory 
for business in Denmark and interruptible contracts exist, but at bilateral and low level and 
much less used than in for example Norway. Experience has shown that the critical move is 
to actually have the customers charged by the hourly prices from wholesale markets. 
5. Final comments and conclusions 
Security of electricity supply has often been considered a public good. We find this 
property is changing from a pure public good towards being excludable for individual 
customers. This happens as excludability becomes technically feasible and with reasonable 
transaction costs by the spreading of smart meters. Also elements of congestible public goods 
become more relevant if we consider reducing adequacy requirements. Before constructing 
sophisticated separate markets there is however much to achieve from improving the 
functionality of existing power markets rather than just creating new isolated markets for 
security of supply. The more markets that are created the less volume in each market, the 
higher transaction costs and the more risk for exemption of market power. Therefore, 
improvements in the spot and regulating power markets should be emphasised if possible.  
Supply interruptions are to a large extent caused by numerous events in the distribution 
grids and are rarely caused by non-adequate capacity at least in the power systems of 
Europe and especially the Nordic area. We find that there are basically no effort made to 
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balance the costs that generation adequacy implies with the cost of reducing the lost 
electricity due to interruptions in the distribution grid. A first efficiency improvement might 
be to adjust the effort so that marginal cost for securing supply are at similar levels in 
generation capacity and in network maintenance and equipment quality. This step does not 
require customer interaction or market construction.  
Demand response is one of the most obvious ways of improving how we establish 
adequate resources and this is also facilitated by metering combined with appropriate tariff 
schemes. With increased price response in the existing market, the load duration curve 
would flatten and the profitability of new power (or transmission) capacity would increase. 
This adequacy part of security of supply is thus influenced by the existing markets to a large 
extent, whereas, the problems caused by faults in transmission and distribution equipment is 
less directly influenced by the existing power markets. 
Secondarily, a consumer defined level of security might improve welfare even if supply 
security will be reduced. We should in the electricity system consider that there is a balance 
between the cost we impose on consumers and the willingness to pay that characterize 
consumers. More effort should be used to determine willingness to pay for security or value 
of lost loads for different customer categories and at different timing of interruption. A more 
dynamic security effort, for example by operating dynamic reserve requirements would 
reduce costs at times where consumers have low willingness to pay.  
Finally, different willingness to pay among customers and construction of simple or more 
advanced markets might increase welfare further. However, we would question if it is 
possible to create well functioning new markets for security of supply, and is it really better 
than improving the functioning of existing markets. Technological developments will make 
it possible to create markets in the future, but it is probably advisable to increase 
effectiveness of existing markets as at least part of the possible welfare losses can be reduced 
by including different forms of demand response in existing markets. 
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